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Daisy Gray*
ABSTRACT
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court addressed the tension
between free speech and protecting children by holding child
pornography outside the scope of First Amendment protections.
Critical to the Court’s decision was the fact that child sexual abuse is
necessary to produce child pornography. But what if technological
advancement removed child abuse from the equation? The recent
phenomena of virtual child pornography and morphed images involve
the digital alteration of adult pornography to create the appearance of
child pornography. The Alaska legislature amended its child
pornography statute in response to these developments, proscribing the
possession of morphed images. While the federal government has
attempted to regulate this digitally altered child pornography, the
majority of states aside from Alaska remain silent on the issue.
This Note explores the relationship between free speech jurisprudence
and the harm that morphed images pose to children, arguing that
Alaska’s child pornography statute is a promising model for other
states to address the threat that digital child pornography poses.
However, this Note concludes that pornographic material must be
intrinsically related to child abuse to justify its prohibition.
Accordingly, this Note argues that while a state statutory ban on
materials that rely exclusively on digital doctoring is likely
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unconstitutional, the Alaska statute prohibiting pornographic images
that involve the digital editing of an identifiable child’s face onto an
adult’s body is constitutional. Other states should thus follow Alaska’s
example and enact a statutory ban on morphed images to ensure efforts
to protect children keep pace with technological advancement.

I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2016, a federal court sentenced Petersburg resident
Marvin Mitchell Jackson to five years in prison for the transportation of
child pornography.1 The sentencing judge highlighted the severity of
Jackson’s crime, noting the “devastating” impact the images could have
on their subjects.2 When it comes to child pornography, this assertion is
relatively non-controversial: courts have long justified prohibitions on its
possession because child pornography and child sex abuse are
“intrinsically related.”3
However, Jackson’s conduct differs from traditional child
pornography in that the materials he possessed did not depict an actual
child engaged in sexually explicit conduct.4 Rather, Jackson used digital
editing software to manipulate the innocent images of children—taken
from Facebook—to create the appearance of sexually explicit conduct.5
Under federal law, the possession of these “morphed” images—images
where the face of an identifiable child has been digitally inserted onto a
sexually explicit image of an adult—is a crime.6 Alaska similarly
proscribes the possession of these images at the state level.7
But in the majority of states, Jackson would not have committed a
crime.8 Despite the ease with which a tech-savvy individual can digitally
alter material to create the appearance of child pornography, state laws
have yet to catch up.9 This digitally altered child pornography typically
falls into two categories: either morphed child pornography, known as
morphed images, where an innocent picture of a child’s face is digitally
1. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Alaska, Petersburg Man
Sentenced to Federal Prison for Transportation of Child Pornography (Dec. 21,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/petersburg-man-sentencedfederal-prison-transportation-child-pornography.
2. Id.
3. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
4. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 34 U.S.C.).
7. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127(a) (2021).
8. See infra note 148.
9. See infra note 148.
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superimposed onto a sexually explicit image of an adult, or virtual child
pornography, which refers to entirely computer-generated images
intended to depict children engaging in sexually explicit activity.10
The technological ability to create realistic-looking morphed and
virtual child pornography poses the risk that the ordinary viewer cannot
distinguish digitally altered child pornography from that which is real.11
The proliferation of morphed and virtual child pornography
highlights an important gap in state child exploitation legislation: one
which Alaska has remedied. In 2010, the Alaska legislature passed an
amendment to the child pornography statute to criminalize the
possession of sexually explicit materials that portray either an actual
minor or a depiction of a part of a minor that has been manipulated to
make it appear that the minor is engaging in the sexually explicit
conduct.12 Had state police caught wind of Jackson’s conduct before the
federal officers, the Alaska statutes would empower state prosecutors to
criminally charge him for the possession of morphed images.
Accordingly, for states seeking to proactively address the possession of
morphed images through statute, Alaska provides a promising model.
But there is a constitutional catch. The countervailing state interest
in protecting free speech limits the extent to which Alaska and other states
can regulate morphed and virtual child pornography.13 Congressional
efforts to proscribe such pornography at the federal level illustrate the
thorny constitutional territory that the issue presents. In 1996, Congress
passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA), which proscribed
both morphed images depicting an identifiable child and virtual child
pornography.14 The United States Supreme Court then struck down the
virtual child pornography provision of the CPPA on First Amendment
grounds in 2002, declining to analyze the constitutional viability of
banning morphed images.15 The following year, Congress passed revised
legislation proscribing pornography “indistinguishable” from nondoctored images of child sexual abuse, again extending the reach of its
child pornography statute to highly sophisticated virtual child
10. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 4–5 (2003); see Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26–31 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2251(d), 2252, 2252A, 2256) (noting Congress’s findings that
new technology makes it easier to alter images and makes it difficult to determine
if they were made using actual children).
11. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 5 (2003).
12. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127(a) (2021).
13. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person may freely speak, write, and
publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”).
14. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 § 121 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2251(d), 2252, 2252A, 2256).
15. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 234, 242, 258 (2002).
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pornography.16 As of October 2021, the revised virtual child pornography
provisions had not been challenged in federal court. While several circuits
have weighed in on the morphed images provision, none have struck it
down and the Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari on the issue.17
Despite the federal prohibition on morphed and virtual child
pornography, both remain legal under the laws of several states.18
Although states have a compelling interest in protecting children, they
must legislate within the bounds of the First Amendment. Because the
state interest in protecting children both necessitates and justifies a
prohibition on morphed images, such a prohibition is likely within the
bounds of the First Amendment. However, given the tenuous
constitutional viability of a statute proscribing virtual child pornography,
state-level regulation of virtual images is unwise at this juncture.
This Note begins in Part II by detailing the current legal landscape
surrounding the regulation of morphed images and virtual child
pornography. Because state-level legislation necessarily must comply
with the federal constitution, a significant portion of the legal background
involves federal law.19 Part III analyzes the constitutional viability of state
legislation proscribing morphed images, arguing that Alaska’s statutory
prohibition comports with the First Amendment. By explaining the
cognizable harms that morphed images pose to children, Part III further
advocates for states without an explicit statutory ban on morphed images
to adopt legislation analogous to Alaska’s. Part IV then explores both
whether Alaska should proscribe virtual child pornography from a policy
perspective and whether it could do so without encroaching on First
Amendment protections. Ultimately, this Note concludes that Alaska’s
interests in protecting children constitutionally justify the state
prohibition on the possession of morphed images. Accordingly, other
states should model prohibitions on morphed children pornography after
Alaska’s statute. Although the relationship between child abuse and
purely virtual child pornography is currently too attenuated to justify
intruding on speech, this Note does not foreclose the possibility that
future research and technological developments might later justify a ban
on virtual child pornography that could survive strict scrutiny review.

16. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 501–504, 117 Stat. 650, 676–682
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2256, 1466).
17. See infra Section II.F.1; United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir.
2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
18. See infra Section II.F.2.
19. The standards for evaluating restrictions on speech under the Alaska
Constitution are the same as for evaluating restrictions under the federal
constitution. See infra Part II.A.
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II. THE LIMITS ON REGULATING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court held that child
pornography produced using an actual child constituted unprotected
speech, explaining that the governmental interest in protecting children
from abuse justified excluding child pornography from the First
Amendment’s ambit.20 Since then, Congress has passed and amended
several statutes criminalizing the possession of child pornography. In
1996, Congress enacted a statute intended to regulate the possession of
virtual child pornography.21 The Supreme Court, however, struck down
the statute as unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, but left
open whether different circumstances could ever justify a ban on virtual
child pornography.22
This Part begins with an overview of First Amendment
jurisprudence on child pornography regulations, explaining how the
Supreme Court has addressed the tension between the need to protect
children and the constitutional free speech prerogative. This Part then
discusses the federal regulation landscape of virtual child pornography,
focusing on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition that the relationship between virtual child pornography and
child abuse is too tenuous to justify curtailing speech.23 Likewise, this Part
examines how the Alaska courts and legislature have regulated child
pornography, noting that only morphed images have been criminalized.
Finally, this Part distinguishes morphed images from virtual child
pornography from a constitutional perspective, discussing how federal
and state courts’ analyses of regulations on morphed images suggest that
morphed images present a tangible threat to children. Accordingly, while
the Supreme Court declined to find that virtual child pornography harms
children, lower courts have found that the harms morphed images pose
to children can justify their prohibition.
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,

20. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 (1982).
21. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-26–31 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2251(d), 2252,
2252A, 2256).
22. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253–54 (2002) (“Without a
significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may not
prohibit speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in
illegal conduct.”).
23. Id. at 256.
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“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”24
Article I, section 5 of the Alaska Constitution guarantees “[e]very person
may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right.”25 Both the United States and Alaska Supreme
Courts analyze content-based restrictions on speech under strict scrutiny,
requiring that the contested rule or regulation be “narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling governmental interest” and “the least restrictive
means available to vindicate that interest.”26
Although content-based restrictions typically trigger strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has held
that certain distinct categories of speech, such as obscenity and child
pornography, constitute unprotected speech that the government can
permissibly restrict without triggering any First Amendment
protections.27 The Alaska Supreme Court has similarly held obscenity to
be outside the scope of protected speech.28
B. Child Pornography Prohibitions in the Twentieth Century
Prior to 2002, the legal doctrine surrounding the prohibition of child
pornography was relatively well-settled.29 Legislators originally relied on
the obscenity doctrine—which excluded the category of obscene speech
from the scope of the First Amendment—to regulate child pornography.30
In 1982, the Supreme Court held that child pornography was a distinct
category of unprotected speech, allowing states to proscribe its
distribution regardless of whether the material is obscene.31
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5.
26. Club SinRock, LLC v. Mun. of Anchorage, 445 P.3d 1031, 1038 (Alaska
2019) (citing Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 206–
07 (Alaska 2007)); see also Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989) (applying the same “narrowly drawn” standard to content-based
restrictions on speech). Both Alaska and federal law consider restrictions on
sexually explicit conduct to be content-based. See Club SinRock, 445 P.3d at 1038;
Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
27. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (holding obscenity is
unprotected speech); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 (1982) (holding child
pornography is unprotected speech).
28. Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644, 647 (Alaska 1972).
29. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240, 258 (2002) (striking
down virtual child pornography provision of the Child Pornography Prevention
Act on First Amendment grounds and explaining that Miller and Ferber are the
applicable standards to analyze regulations on pornography).
30. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 21; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753 (“The Court of Appeals
proceeded on the assumption that . . . obscenity . . . constitutes the appropriate
line dividing protected from unprotected expression by which to measure a
regulation directed at child pornography.”).
31. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
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1. Obscenity is Unprotected Speech
The Supreme Court has consistently held that First Amendment
protections do not extend to obscene speech,32 which it defines as
“material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest.”33 In Miller v. California,34 the Court attempted to promulgate
precise standards for what constituted obscenity, reaffirming its
categorical holding in Roth v. United States35 that obscenity is unprotected
speech.36 Acknowledging the need for states to tread carefully when
regulating speech, the Court required that for speech to be obscene, the
trier of fact must find:
(a) . . . the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest . . . ; (b) . . . the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.37
Thus, in the wake of Miller, the government could only proscribe child
pornography if it satisfied the three-pronged Miller test.
2. Child Pornography is Unprotected Speech
The Court declined to apply the Miller obscenity standard to a state
statute proscribing child pornography in New York v. Ferber,38 choosing
instead to fashion a First Amendment carveout to reflect the State’s
uniquely compelling interest in protecting children.39 At issue in Ferber
was a New York statute that prohibited knowingly “produc[ing],
direct[ing] or promot[ing] any performance which includes sexual
conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.”40
Upholding the statute against a First Amendment challenge, the
Court emphasized that child pornography is “intrinsically related to the
32. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957) (reasoning that
obscenity had no “redeeming social importance” and there was a “universal
judgment that obscenity should be restrained”).
33. Id. at 487.
34. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
35. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484–85 (holding “obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press”).
36. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
37. Id. at 24 (internal quotations omitted).
38. 458 U.S. 747, 753 (1982).
39. See id. at 755–56 (holding that, like for obscenity statutes, “states are
entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of
children”).
40. Id. at 751. The statutory definition of “promote” encompassed
distribution. Id.
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sexual abuse of children.”41 The Court explained that while the child
abuse involved in child pornography occurs at the time of production, the
distribution of child pornography furthers this abuse in two ways.42 First,
distribution immortalizes the sexual abuse of the child, perpetuating the
consequent harm long after production has occurred.43 Second,
proscribing distribution is necessary to curtail production by “dry[ing] up
the market” for such materials.44
Although Ferber presented the more limited question of whether a
state could proscribe the distribution of child pornography, the Court
extended its holding to possession in Osborne v. Ohio.45 The Court found
that the State’s interest in protecting children justified criminalizing
possession in order to dry up the market for child pornography and
“stamp out this vice at all levels of the distribution chain.”46
C.

The Court Addresses Virtual Child Pornography: Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition

Despite the categorical exclusion of obscenity and child
pornography from First Amendment protection, courts have been
reluctant to stretch the boundaries of First Amendment jurisprudence by
extending Ferber or Osborne to scenarios where the match between
statutory prohibitions and the state interest asserted is less precise. In the
case of virtual child pornography, where no actual child is used to create
the material, the line between protecting children and encroaching on free
speech begins to blur.
1. Federal Law and the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996
The 1984 Child Protection Act (CPA) marked the first federal
prohibition on the possession of child pornography.47 Congress had
previously passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act in 1977, which prohibited the distribution of obscene child
pornography.48 However, following the Supreme Court’s holding in

41. Id. at 759.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 759–60.
45. 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
46. Compare Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760 (finding that prohibiting distribution of
child pornography helped dry up the market for those materials), with Osborne,
495 U.S. at 110 (finding that criminalizing possession helped to dry up market).
47. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2254).
48. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423,
2251–2253).
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Ferber that Congress could permissibly regulate private possession of
child pornography, the CPA both eliminated the requirement that child
pornography be obscene and extended the prohibition on child
pornography to its possession.49
Responding to concerns that the development of new technology
allowed “visual depictions of what appear to be children engaging in
sexually explicit conduct that are virtually indistinguishable to the
unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” Congress enacted the
Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) in 1996.50 The statute
amended the federal child pornography statute to define child
pornography as:
any visual depiction . . . of sexually explicit conduct, where . . .
such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; [or] such visual depiction has been
created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable
minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.51
The statute defined an “identifiable minor” to include both real minors
who were underage at the time the depiction was “created, adapted, or
modified,” and those who were “recognizable as an actual person” and
had a visual depiction of them as a minor altered to create the visual
depiction at issue.52
The legislative findings advanced three reasons why virtual child
pornography posed distinct harms to children.53 First, adults may use
virtual images to coerce actual children into engaging in sexual conduct
with them.54 Second, because sexual abusers use child pornography to
“whet their . . . sexual appetites,” the proliferation of virtual
pornographic materials may “inflame[] the desire[] of child molesters,
pedophiles, and child pornographers who prey on children,” in turn
increasing the demand for child pornography and heightening the risk of
sexual abuse.55 Finally, the existence of child pornography as content,
regardless of whether an actual child was used, harms children by

49. Child Protection Act of 1984 § 4.
50. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-26–31 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2251(d), 2252,
2252A, 2256).
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(9). The “identifiable minor” provisions of the CPPA and
the current statute are identical. Compare id., with Child Pornography Prevention
Act § 121.
53. See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2 (1996).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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characterizing them as sexual objects in the social psyche.56
2. A Constitutional Challenge
The United States Supreme Court then confronted whether the
CPPA’s prohibition on virtual child pornography violated the First
Amendment in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. The Free Speech
Coalition57 mounted a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) and (D),
arguing that the statute prohibiting the possession and pandering of
virtual child pornography was both vague and overbroad.58
The Court held that the purported harm that virtual child
pornography posed to children did not justify the CPPA’s intrusion on
speech.59 The Court first analyzed the CPPA under Miller and Ferber to
ascertain whether virtual child pornography constituted either obscenity
or child pornography, which would render it unprotected speech.60
Finding that virtual child pornography constituted neither, the Court
then evaluated the substantive provisions of the CPPA under strict
scrutiny, ultimately concluding that the statute was not narrowly tailored
to the government’s interest in preventing child sex abuse.61
The Court began its analysis by determining whether the CPPA fit
under the Miller definition of obscenity, noting that the government
cannot prohibit speech simply because it “offend[s] our sensibilities.”62 In
that vein, the Court determined that the reach of the CPPA expanded
beyond the circumscribed categories of Miller.63 Unlike obscene speech,
which must appeal to the “prurient interest,” materials that the CPPA
covers could be benign, such as “a picture in a psychology manual, [or] a
movie depicting the horrors of sexual abuse.”64
Next, differentiating the CPPA from the statute at issue in Ferber, the
Court reasoned that virtual child pornography is distinct from traditional
child pornography.65 Although the dissemination of traditional child

56. Id.
57. The Free Speech Coalition is a “non-profit trade association for the adult
industry.” FREE SPEECH COALITION, https://www.freespeechcoalition.com (last
visited Apr. 23, 2021).
58. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 234 (2002). The Court noted
that the Free Speech Coalition did not raise a challenge to § 2256(8)(C), which
covers morphed images, and did not consider its constitutionality. Id. at 242.
59. Id. at 241–42, 246.
60. Id. at 240.
61. Id. at 240, 256, 258; see State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 260 (N.H. 2008) (noting
that while not explicit, the Court applied strict scrutiny to analyze the CPPA in
Ashcroft).
62. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 245–46.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 246.
65. Id. at 250.
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pornography is “intrinsically related” to child sex abuse, the relationship
between virtual images and sex abuse is more attenuated.66 Unlike
materials that showcase actual children, virtual child pornography, in the
Court’s view, victimizes no one.67 The Court thus rejected the
Government’s argument that virtual child pornography increases the
likelihood of child sex abuse, emphasizing how the First Amendment
counsels against criminalizing speech simply because it “increases the
chance an unlawful act will be committed at some indefinite future
time.”68
While concluding that the Government failed to demonstrate a
sufficient link between virtual child pornography and child abuse, the
Court did not explicitly close the door on the argument that one could
arise.69 Instead, the Court ended its analysis with a determination that the
Government failed to introduce evidence of a “significantly stronger,
more direct connection” between the speech and the harm.70
The Court’s reasoning in Ashcroft carries two key implications for
future legislation. First, the decision emphasizes that although virtual
child pornography does not constitute a per se exception to the First
Amendment, legislation narrowly tailored to preventing child sex abuse
may survive a First Amendment challenge.71
Second, for legislators to effectively regulate virtual child
pornography, they must come to terms with the ultimate policy
determination driving the Ashcroft decision: the government’s interests in
regulating virtual child pornography are inherently distinct from those
implicated by real child pornography.72 The Ferber Court premised its
determination that child pornography was unprotected speech not on the
substantive content of the speech, but rather on how it was produced.73
No matter how problematic virtual child pornography may be, it does not
derive from child sex abuse. Accordingly, trying to fit regulation of virtual
child pornography under the Ferber umbrella is unlikely to succeed.

66. Id. at 249–50.
67. Id. at 250.
68. Id. at 253 (internal quotations omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 250 (“In contrast to the speech in Ferber, speech that itself is the
record of sexual abuse, the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and
creates no victims by its production.”).
73. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982).
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D. The Uncertain Footing of Virtual Child Pornography in Federal
Law
Despite the Court’s holding in Ashcroft, Congress’s 2003 passage of
the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of
Children Today Act (“PROTECT Act”) revived the issue of whether
virtual child pornography and morphed images ought to be federally
banned.74 This Section dissects the language of the PROTECT Act with a
focus on its similarity to the CPPA to outline the current state of federal
law on child pornography.
Although Ashcroft unambiguously held that certain provisions of the
CPPA were unconstitutional restrictions of speech, the Court did not
sound the death knell of the regulation of all digitally created child
pornography.75 A year after the Supreme Court handed down the Ashcroft
decision, Congress passed the PROTECT Act, which parallels the CPPA
in several ways. Like the CPPA, the PROTECT Act prohibits receiving,
distributing, or possessing child pornography.76 To define child
pornography, the legislation retains two provisions verbatim from the
CPPA that the Court did not renounce in Ashcroft: the definition of child
pornography as depicting an actual child, and the definition of child
pornography that encompasses the use of a visual depiction that has been
altered to appear as though an identifiable minor is engaging in sexual
activity.77
However, the PROTECT Act includes one notable change to the
language of one of the CPPA’s provisions that the Court took issue with.
The updated language of 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) defines child
pornography as “a digital image, computer image, or computergenerated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”78 Rather than requiring the
digitally created image be “indistinguishable from” traditional child
pornography, the CPPA included any digital image that “appears to be”
depicting a minor engaging in explicit conduct.79
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of a
separate provision of the Act as applied to a distributor of virtual child
74. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 34 U.S.C.).
75. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2256.
76. Id. § 2252A.
77. See id. § 2256(8)(B).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-26–31 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2251(d), 2252,
2252A, 2256).
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pornography,80 it has yet to hear a First Amendment challenge to the
updated statutory language regulating possession. Given the Court’s
determination in Ashcroft that virtual child pornography did not pose a
policy problem sufficient to justify curtailing speech, it is unlikely the
language of the PROTECT Act cures this overbreadth.81
The PROTECT Act and the CPPA represent Congress’s efforts to
address the fact that technology is at a point where it is virtually
impossible to distinguish between images that depict real children and
those that are computer renderings.82 Under the PROTECT Act, what
happens to defendants who genuinely do not know what type of child
pornography they possess?
In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,83 the Court interpreted the
mens rea provision of the PROTECT Act, which imposes a “knowingly”
requirement, to apply to whether the images depicted a minor.84
Although the Court admitted that, under the most natural reading of the
statute, the mens rea provision would modify only the immediately
preceding verbs, criminal law interpretive principles counseled in favor
of “interpreting criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter
requirements.”85 Although X-Citement Video only addressed the portion
of the PROTECT Act that covered receipt and distribution, courts have
applied its holding to possession as well.86
80. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008). The pandering
provision of the PROTECT Act has applicability to virtual child pornography. Id.
However, this provision only proscribes a narrow class of virtual child
pornography: that which is pandered as actual child pornography. Id. at 303–04.
Because the provision is both limited in scope and applies only to distribution of
pornography, not mere possession, id. at 293, this Note does not discuss it. There
are several pieces of scholarship that discuss the pandering provision at length.
See, e.g., Rosalind E. Bell, Reconciling the PROTECT Act with the First Amendment,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1879, 1907–08 (2012).
81. See infra Section III.B (discussing whether state statutory ban on virtual
child pornography could satisfy strict scrutiny).
82. AJ Dellinger, How to Spot a Photoshopped Picture, MIC (Aug. 30, 2019),
https://www.mic.com/impact/photoshopped-images-can-be-hard-to-spotheres-how-to-tell-real-fake-apart-18688498; see Dan Patterson, From Deepfake to
“Cheap Fake,” It’s Getting Harder to Tell What’s True on Your Favorite Apps and
Websites, CBS NEWS (June 13, 2019, 8:15 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-are-deepfakes-how-to-tell-if-video-isfake/ (“These days, tech firms, media companies and consumers are all routinely
forced to make determinations about whether content is authentic or fake—and
it’s increasingly hard to tell the difference.”).
83. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
84. Id. at 78.
85. Id. at 68, 70.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 41 F. App’x 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2002)
(requiring knowledge that an image depicts an actual minor to impose liability
under § 2252A); United States v. Payne, MO–00–CR–107, 2000 WL 33348782, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2000) (“While the statute before the Court is 2252A, not 2252(a),
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In contrast, the legislative history behind the PROTECT Act
unambiguously indicates Congress’s intent to eliminate a mens rea
requirement with respect to whether the pornographic images depicted a
real minor.87 The related 2003 Senate Report establishes that the
government’s burden is only “(1) that an ordinary person viewing the
depiction would conclude that the depiction is of an actual minor; and (2)
that the image depicts ‘sexually explicit conduct’ as defined in S
2256(2)(B).”88 Consequently, the mens rea requirement for the current
statute likely does not extend to the objective age of minority.89 Courts
have left open, however, whether knowledge that pornography depicts a
real child is a constitutional requirement or an issue of statutory
interpretation.90 This issue will dovetail with the constitutionality of
banning virtual child pornography in the first instance.91 Ultimately, in
the wake of Ashcroft, several provisions of current federal law remain on
unstable footing.
E. Alaska Law Permits Virtual Child Pornography and Bans Morphed
Images
Unlike federal laws, the Alaska statutes do not cover purely virtual
child pornography. However, Alaska statutorily prohibits the knowing
this Court believes that the two statutes are similar enough that the knowledge
requirement . . . is equally applicable to 2252A . . . .”).
87. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 8 (2003).
88. Id.
89. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 75 (“To clarify the situation, the
legislative history might reflect that the defendant’s knowledge of the age of the
child is not an element of the offense but that the bill is not intended to apply to
innocent transportation with no knowledge of the nature or character of the
material involved.”) (internal quotations omitted).
90. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kenney, 874 N.E.2d 1089, 1098, 1103 (Mass.
2007) (finding that a mens rea requirement that a possessor of child pornography
“knows or reasonably should know [the child] to be under the age of 18” was not
constitutionally overbroad); Ferrick v. State, 217 P.3d 418, 421 (Alaska Ct. App.
2009) (interpreting Alaska’s child pornography statute to require knowledge that
the pornography depicted a real child).
91. Due process generally requires that the government affirmatively prove
the elements of a crime. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975). If a ban on
virtual child pornography is unconstitutional, a mens rea requirement as to the
age of the subject less than actual knowledge would allow the government to
secure a conviction without ever proving that a real child was used. The Alaska
Court of Appeals has interpreted its statute to require knowledge of the real
nature of the materials, because a government conviction based on an
“aware[ness] of a substantial probability” that the materials depicted real children
could punish conduct outside the scope of the criminal law. See Ferrick, 217 P.3d
at 421. Thus, whether the state can punish the awareness of a substantial
probability that the materials were real child pornography turns on whether the
state can punish possession of virtual child pornography.
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possession of child pornography, including morphed images. Section
11.61.127(a) of the Alaska Statutes states:
A person commits the crime of possession of child pornography
if the person knowingly possesses or knowingly accesses on a
computer with intent to view any material that visually depicts
conduct described in AS 11.41.455(a) knowing that the
production of the material involved the use of a child under 18
years of age who engaged in the conduct or a depiction of a part of
an actual child under 18 years of age who, by manipulation, creation,
or modification, appears to be engaged in the conduct.92
The exploitation of a minor statute, section 11.41.455(a) of the Alaska
Statutes, states:
A person commits the crime of unlawful exploitation of a minor
if, in the state and with the intent of producing a live
performance, film, audio, video, electronic, or electromagnetic
recording, photograph, negative, slide, book, newspaper,
magazine, or other material that visually or aurally depicts the
conduct listed in (1)-(7) of this subsection, the person knowingly
induces or employs a child under 18 years of age to engage in,
or photographs, films, records, or televises a child under 18 years
of age engaged in, the following actual or simulated conduct.93
Alaska amended the child pornography statute in 2010 to include the
provision proscribing morphed images.94 As amended, the statutory text
expands the definition of child pornography to cover the digital alteration
of a non-pornographic image of an actual child to make it appear that the
actual child is engaged in sexual conduct.95 To prosecute an individual for
the possession of morphed images, the government is not required to
prove the identity of the depicted minor.96
Prior to the amendment, the Alaska Court of Appeals interpreted the
statute to only apply to materials that depict actual minors.97 Reading the
statute in light of Ashcroft, the court determined in Ferrick v. State that, to
be liable under the statute, the defendant must have possessed
“pornographic materials that were produced using real children under

92. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127(a) (2021) (emphasis added).
93. Id. § 11.41.455(a) The prohibited conduct referenced in the statute includes
sexual penetration, lewd touching, masturbation, bestiality, lewd exhibition, and
sexual masochism or sadism. Id. § 11.41.455(a)(1)–(7).
94. 2010 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 18 § 11.61.127.
95. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127(a).
96. Id. § 11.61.127(e).
97. Ferrick v. State, 217 P.3d 418, 420 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009)
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the age of 18.”98 In doing so, the court specifically declined to interpret
that statute to include virtual child pornography.99
The court of appeals further clarified that while the government
must prove a defendant committed the proscribed act to impose liability,
it need only show “that the defendant was aware of a ‘substantial
probability’” that the materials he possessed depicted a minor.100
Specifically, in Ferrick, the defendant, Ferrick, challenged his child
pornography possession conviction by arguing, inter alia, that section
11.61.127(a) of the Alaska Statutes covered virtual child pornography and
was thus invalid under Ashcroft.101 In support of his argument, Ferrick
explained that the Alaska Statutes define “knowingly” to include either
actual knowledge or an awareness that there is a high likelihood of the
prohibited circumstance.102 Under Ferrick’s reading, the statute would
impose criminal liability on a defendant who only possessed virtual child
pornography but nevertheless knew that the materials likely depicted
minors.103
The court of appeals rejected Ferrick’s argument, determining that
section 11.41.455(a) only referred to the exploitation of actual children.104
Accordingly, because 11.61.127(a) prohibits only depictions of conduct
proscribed under 11.41.455(a), the actus reus requirement in the latter
statute cabins the crime of possession to materials produced using actual
children.105 The court accordingly interpreted 11.61.127(a) to require
knowledge as to what renders the conduct criminal: that the materials
depicted someone under eighteen years of age.106
While the Alaska legislature amended the child pornography statute
to include morphed images the year after the court of appeals decided
Ferrick, the court’s holding that the statute does not proscribe virtual child
pornography still stands. First, the court analyzed the statute with respect
to Ashcroft, which did not address morphed images.107 Because the
98. Id. at 419.
99. Id. (“We further conclude that Alaska’s child pornography statute does
not prohibit the possession of ‘virtual’ child pornography, but rather is confined
to the possession of pornography that was produced using real children.”).
100. Id. at 421
101. Id. at 420.
102. Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(2) (2021) (defining knowledge as
either actual knowledge of a circumstance or an “aware[ness] of a substantial
probability of its existence”).
103. Ferrick, 217 P.3d at 421.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 421–22 (“The statute does not reach [virtual child
pornography]—and, therefore, the statute conforms to the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.”). When interpreting statutes,
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subsequent amendment only expanded the statute to cover images that
depict “a part of an actual child,” the statute remains consistent with the
court’s holding that the statute does not apply to virtual child
pornography.108 Second, the court in Ferrick engaged in statutory
construction to determine the limited scope of conduct that the child
pornography statute covered.109 Accordingly, the requirement of an
“actual child” limits future courts’ ability to extrapolate a ban on virtual
child pornography from the statutory text.110
Thus, despite the subsequent statutory ban on morphed images,
Ferrick remains relevant to the discussion of manipulated child
pornography in two ways. First, it clarifies that the Alaska courts have not
read a ban on virtual child pornography into the state’s child
pornography statute.111 Indeed, in the wake of Ashcroft, several other
statutes have interpreted child pornography possession statutes
similarly.112 Second, the court’s discussion of the statutory scheme makes
clear that the act of possessing actual child pornography is an absolute
predicate for liability: an individual who possesses materials which he
believes to depict real children but that are fortuitously merely virtual has
not committed a crime.113
F. Morphed Images and Real Children
The Alaska statute explicitly proscribes the possession of images
courts tend to construe a statute “to alter the common law only when that
disposition is clear.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 318 (1st ed. 2012).
108. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127(a) (2021) (emphasis added). See SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 107 (noting that a statute will be construed to alter the
common law only when “that disposition is clear”).
109. See Ferrick, 217 P.3d at 421 (explaining that the construction of section
11.61.127(a) as proscribing only conduct involving a real child precluded the
defendant’s claims).
110. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127(a) (“A person commits the crime of child
pornography if the person knowingly possesses . . . any material that visually
depicts conduct described in AS 11.41.455(a) knowing that the production of the
material involved . . . a depiction of a part of an actual child under 18 years of age
who, by manipulation, creation, or modification, appears to be engaged in the
conduct.”).
111. Ferrick, 217 P.3d at 421.
112. See, e.g., People v. Alexander, 791 N.E.2d 506, 515 (Ill. 2003) (holding
unconstitutional the provision of the state statute criminalizing possession of
virtual child pornography); State v. Fingal, 666 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003) (holding the Minnesota child pornography statute only applies to
possession of materials depicting an actual minor).
113. See Ferrick, 217 P.3d at 421 (“But AS 11.61.127(a) also requires proof of
an actus reus—proof of an underlying act of possession of a certain type of
pornographic materials.”).
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depicting real minors that have been manipulated to appear as though
the minors are engaged in sexually explicit conduct.114 This prohibition
was animated by the need to protect minors against the harm caused by
the digital manipulation of their images.115
Despite the federal prohibition on morphed images, however,
several states have yet to follow in Alaska’s footsteps and codify a ban on
morphed images.116 Despite this inaction, the application of First
Amendment principles to morphed images indicates that the state
interest in protecting children justifies legislative action. This Section
explores state statutory law on morphed images and discusses how
federal and state courts have addressed the issue on both constitutional
and statutory dimensions.
1. Federal Courts’ First Amendment Flexibility
While the Supreme Court has yet to address directly whether a
statutory prohibition on morphed images would survive strict scrutiny,
the underlying interest in protecting children provides a compelling
reason to intrude on speech.117
In dicta, the Court noted in Ashcroft that because the likeness of a real
child is used in morphed images, these images “implicate the interests of
real children and are in that sense closer to the images in Ferber.”118
However, the Court did not directly consider the constitutionality of the
morphed images provision of the CPPA nor has it considered the
analogous provision in the PROTECT Act.119
Federal courts have consistently held that prohibitions on morphed
images of child pornography do not offend the First Amendment because
morphed images pose an independent harm to minors.120 For example,
the Eighth Circuit has held that charging a defendant under 18 U.S.C. §
2256(A)(2) for the knowing receipt of an image that depicted the face of
114. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127(a).
115. An Act Relating to the Crimes of Harassment, Possession of Child Pornography,
and Distribution of Indecent Material to a Minor; Relating to Suspending Imposition of
Sentence and Conditions of Probation or Parole for Certain Sex Offenses; Relating to
Aggravating Factors in Sentencing; Relating to Registration as a Sex Offender or Child
Kidnapper; Amending Rule 16, Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure; and Providing for
an Effective Date, HOUSE FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 26th Leg., (Apr. 12, 2010 )
[hereinafter Finance Committee Minutes] (statement of Sue MacLean, Director,
Criminal Division, Department of Law at 8:23:13 AM)
116. See infra Section II.F.2.
117. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002) (declining to
analyze whether the ban on morphed images in the CPPA was constitutional).
118. Id.
119. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that a morphed image of a minor’s head superimposed onto another’s nude body
could be prosecuted consistent with the First Amendment); see also infra note 127.
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an identifiable minor superimposed onto the nude body of another
person was not inconsistent with Ashcroft.121 In United States v. Bach, the
court upheld the constitutionality of the statutory definition as applied to
a defendant who edited an identifiable child’s face onto an unidentifiable
child’s body, reasoning that because the image in question created a
“lasting record” of the minor seemingly engaged in sexually explicit
conduct, every display of the image further victimized the minor.122
Later, in United States v. Anderson,123 the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the
constitutionality of the statute, this time as applied to an image depicting
a child’s face edited onto an adult’s body.124 The court distinguished the
image from Bach, reasoning that because the morphed image involved a
minor’s face inserted onto the body of an adult, there was no sexual abuse
of any minor.125 While the court declined to categorically exclude
morphed images that depict the nude bodies of adults from First
Amendment protections because of the lack of underlying crime, it
determined that the continued circulation of the image harmed the child
subject, satisfying strict scrutiny.126 The court’s reasoning in Anderson is
important in the context of regulating morphed images because it finds
morphed images harmful to children even when the images depict nude
adults.127
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has found morphed images beyond the
scope of the First Amendment even when the images are not created for
purposes of sexual gratification.128 In Doe v. Boland, morphed images were
121. Bach, 400 F.3d at 632. The defendant challenged the definition of child
pornography in 2256(8)(C), which covers a “visual depiction that . . . [was]
created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in
sexually explicit conduct,” arguing that his conduct did not involve the abuse of
a minor. Id. at 631.
122. Id. at 632. The court also found it important that the nude body in the
picture, although of an unidentifiable minor, nevertheless depicted a minor and
thus recorded a crime. Id.
123. 759 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 2014).
124. Id. at 892–93.
125. Id. at 895.
126. Id. at 895–96. The Second Circuit has held morphed images categorically
beyond the scope of First Amendment protections, reasoning the creation of a
“lasting record” constituted abuse to the minor. United States v. Hotaling, 634
F.3d 725, 729–30 (2d Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has noted that appellate courts
could find morphed images unprotected by analogizing it to child pornography,
rather than “carv[ing] out a separate exception.” Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d
778, 787–88 (9th Cir. 2013).
127. See Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895 (finding that morphed images create a lasting
impression of a minor “seemingly engaged in sexually explicit activity” even
when the body depicted is of an adult) (internal quotations omitted).
128. Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 884 (6th Cir. 2012). Although Boland was a
civil suit brought by the parents of the minors depicted in the morphed images,
the court still engaged in an analysis of the statute to determine whether the
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created when an attorney and technology expert digitally altered nonpornographic images of identifiable minors to make the images appear to
depict the minors engaging in sexually explicit activity.129 The defendant
created these images for a defense team to use at a federal child
pornography trial to demonstrate how easily images can be manipulated
and thus inhibit the state’s ability to prove a defendant’s knowledge that
the images depicted an actual minor.130
To analyze the defendant’s argument that the federal prohibition on
morphed images violated the First Amendment, the court echoed
Hotaling and Bach in finding that morphed images implicate the interests
of real children.131 The court specifically focused on the “risk of
reputational harm” to find morphed images outside the scope of the First
Amendment.132
Two aspects of the court’s decision are notable. First, the court
specifically emphasized the “weak expressive value” of morphed images,
noting that although the defendant did not intend to harm children, the
images nevertheless had that effect.133 Second, the court specifically
emphasized that the harm to children that morphed images impose is not
contingent on the children’s knowledge—”even if [the minors] never see
the images, the specter of pornographic images will cause them
‘continuing harm by haunting [them] in years to come.’”134
In 2020, the Fifth Circuit weighed in, finding morphed child
pornography to be unprotected speech.135 Underpinning the court’s
decision was the determination that First Amendment jurisprudence does
not strictly require underlying child abuse to classify material as child
pornography.136 The court explained that the PROTECT Act’s definition
of “sexually explicit” includes the “lascivious exhibition of the anus,
genitals, or pubic area” of a child.137 Referencing an earlier decision where
it declined to read Ferber as requiring “the minor [to] affirmatively
commit a sexual act or be sexually abused,”138 the Fifth Circuit found the
“reputational and emotional harm” to children as sufficient to exclude

defendant’s conduct was covered by the statute for the purposes of the civil suit.
Id. at 883.
129. Id. at 879.
130. Id. at 879–80.
131. Id. at 884.
132. Id. at 884–85 (internal quotations omitted).
133. Id. at 883, 885.
134. Id. at 884 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990)).
135. United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 267 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 139 (2020).
136. Id. at 266.
137. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v)).
138. United States v. Traweek, 707 F. App’x 213, 215 n.2 (5th Cir. 2017).
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morphed images from First Amendment protections.139
The circuit courts’ findings that morphed images present cognizable
harms to children legally distinguish morphed images from virtual child
pornography.140 While the circuits are split over whether the correct
approach is to classify morphed images as unprotected speech or to apply
strict scrutiny review, there is consensus that the compelling state interest
in protecting children likely justifies the imposition on speech.
2. Divergent State Approaches to Morphed Images
Despite the federal prohibition on morphed images, states remain
divided over whether to adopt parallel legislation.141 For example,
Maryland explicitly bans morphed images, prohibiting the possession of
visual representations “showing an actual child or a computer-generated
image that is indistinguishable from an actual and identifiable child
under the age of 16 years” engaged in sexually explicit conduct.142 New
Mexico has a similar provision for obscene materials that “depict[] a
prohibited sexual act . . . [if] a real child under eighteen years of age, who
is not a participant, is depicted as a participant in that act.” 143 Unlike
Maryland, the New Mexico statute only criminalizes the production or
distribution of this conduct.144 In contrast, states including Colorado,145
Kentucky,146 and California147 have no such explicit statutory bans.148
States have cited a variety of rationales for not including a ban on
morphed images in their statutes, ranging from concern that the provision
would be unconstitutional to a narrow focus on only prohibiting
materials that depict underlying sexual abuse.149 Accordingly, Alaska is

139. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267.
140. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2013) (reasoning
that “morphed images are like traditional child pornography in that they are
records of the harmful sexual exploitation of children”).
141. Fifteen states explicitly include morphed images in their child
pornography statutes. See infra note 150.
142. MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 11-208 (2021). While this statute covers
morphed images, it could also be read to cover virtual child pornography. See infra
note 240.
143. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6A-3(F)–(G) (2021).
144. Id.
145. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.4 (2021)
146. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.335 (West 2021).
147. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.1(a) (West 2021) (prohibiting the possession of
sexually explicit material that “depicts a person under the age of 18 years
personally engaging in or personally simulating sexual conduct”).
148. Several other states lack an explicit statutory prohibition on morphed
images, including but not limited to Massachusetts, Mississippi, and New York.
MASS. GEN. LAWS 272 § 29C (2021); MISS. CODE. ANN § 97-5-33 (2021); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 263.16 (McKinney 2021).
149. See infra text accompanying notes 152–160.
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amongst the minority of states that statutorily proscribe morphed
images.150
Moreover, for states with statutes that do not explicitly ban morphed
images, there is a lack of consensus over whether reviewing courts will
interpret the child pornography statutes to cover such conduct.151 The
general recalcitrance to read in a prohibition on morphed images implies
that for a state to implement such a provision, its best course of action is
to do so legislatively.
For example, in People v. Gerber,152 a California state court reasoned
that the defendant’s conduct—using Microsoft Paint to edit a child’s head
onto an adult’s body—was not within the scope of the state child
pornography statute.153 Relying on legislative history indicating the
purpose of the child pornography statute was to prevent the exploitation
of children, the court held that a real child must have been used to
produce the pornographic element of a work to be considered child
pornography.154
Florida has similarly declined to apply its child pornography statute
to a morphed image.155 The Florida statute states “[i]t is unlawful for any
person to knowingly possess . . . a photograph . . . computer depiction, or
other presentation which, in whole or in part, he or she knows to include
any sexual conduct by a child.”156 In Parker v. State,157 the court reasoned
that the statute applied only to material that captured sexual conduct by
150. The states outside of Alaska, Maryland, and New Mexico that ban
morphed images are Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wyoming. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-27-602 (a)(1) (West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1111(2) (West
2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(b)(3)(A) (West 2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707752(2)(b) (2021); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1(f)(7) (2021); IND. CODE. § 35-42-44(d) (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.145c(b)(i) (2021); MINN. STAT. §
617.246(f)(2)(ii) (2021); MO. REV. STAT. § 573.01(4)(b)(c) (2021); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 119-1.3(c)(1)(iii) (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1 (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4303 (West 2021). While Texas’ statute does not explicitly ban morphed images, the
Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted it to do so. See infra text accompanying
note 175.
151. See, e.g., State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 265 (N.H. 2008) (reversing a
defendant’s conviction for possession of morphed images because state child
pornography statute was unconstitutional as applied to defendant’s conduct);
Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (finding a Florida child
pornography statute did not cover morphed images where a child’s head was
superimposed on an adult’s body); People v. Gerber, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 688, 701
(Ct. App. 2011) (concluding the same for a California statute).
152. 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 688 (Ct. App. 2011).
153. Id. at 694, 701.
154. Id. at 698.
155. See Parker, 81 So. 3d at 453.
156. FLA. STAT. § 827.071 (2021)
157. 81 So. 3d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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a child, finding it inapplicable to a morphed image of a child’s head on an
adult’s body.158
While the California and Florida courts relied on statutory
interpretation to find that the statutes in question did not cover morphed
images, a New Hampshire court in State v. Zidel159 held that applying the
state child pornography statute to the possession of morphed images
would violate the First Amendment.160 The court distinguished the Eighth
Circuit’s holding in Bach, reasoning that the dissemination of morphed
images implicated the interests of the real child depicted, but that private
possession did not.161 Criminalizing mere possession of morphed images,
where “the children d[id] not know of their existence,” did not warrant
the imposition of criminal liability.162 The New Hampshire court thus
declined to find that morphed images presented a tangible harm to
children.163
However, at least three other states have been willing to read in a
prohibition on morphed images into their child pornography statutes. In
2002, a Virginia court held that the state child pornography statute at the
time both applied to the possession of morphed images and survived
strict scrutiny review.164 The court reasoned that by defining “sexually
explicit visual material” as “a digital image or similar visual
representation,” the statute’s plain language encompassed visual
representations beyond an unaltered photograph of a child.165 The court
158. Id. (citing Stelmack v. State, 58 So. 3d 874, 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)).
In Stelmack, decided a year before Parker, the court similarly relied on statutory
interpretation to find a morphed image outside the scope of the child
pornography statute. Stelmack, 58 So. 3d at 876. The court explained that its
decision was based on statutory interpretation rather than policy, writing “[w]e
do not mean to suggest that the possession of composite images of real children
that simulate lewd and lascivious exhibition of children’s genitals should not be
criminalized.” Id. at 877.
159. 940 A.2d 255 (N.H. 2008).
160. Id. at 263–64.
161. Id. at 264–65.
162. Id. at 263.
163. Id.
164. Commonwealth v. Simone, 63 Va. Cir. 216, 245 (Oct. 2003).
165. Id. at 242. When the court decided Simone, Virginia law banned, inter alia,
the possession of pornography materials depicting a person under eighteen years
of age. However, the legislature eventually formalized a ban on morphed images
in statute. Under Virginia law, “child pornography means sexually explicit visual
material which utilizes or has as a subject an identifiable minor.” VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-374.1 (2021) (internal quotations omitted). For the purposes of the statute,
“the term sexually explicit visual material means a picture, photograph, drawing,
sculpture, motion picture film, digital image, including such material stored in a
computer’s temporary Internet cache when three or more images or streaming
videos are present, or similar visual representation.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
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then held that this construction of the statute would survive strict scrutiny
because morphed images are “intrinsically related” to child sex abuse.166
Not only is the use of the likeness of the child inherently damaging,
morphed images create a permanent harmful record of the child.167
An Illinois appellate court recently interpreted the statutory phrase
“films, videotapes, photographs, or . . . any similar visual medium or
reproduction”168 to cover “cutout pictures of young female children’s
faces that had slits cut into the mouths and cutout images of male penises
inserted into those slits.”169 First analyzing whether the defendant’s
conviction for possession of child pornography violated the First
Amendment, the court determined that because Ashcroft did not address
morphed images, the court could not conclusively exclude them as child
pornography.170 The court then referenced the federal circuit court
decisions on the issue, concluding that morphed images “involve the
alteration of ‘innocent pictures of real children so that the children appear
to be engaged in sexual activity’” and thus implicate the interests of real
children.171
After finding a statutory ban on morphed images to comport with
First Amendment principles, the court engaged in de novo review to
determine whether the state statute covered morphed images.172 Unlike
other state courts, which have been unwilling to stretch the boundaries of
the statutory text, the Illinois court noted that, because the cutouts that
the defendant possessed “were visible and conveyed a combination of
still images taken from magazines,” the images were “akin to
photographs and constitute a similar visual medium” as required by the
statute.173 The court thus interpreted the statute to cover the images in
question.
Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals174 has held that
“child pornography can result from image editing and manipulation.”175
166. Simone, 63 Va. Cir. at 242 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S.
234, 249 (2002)).
167. Id.
168. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1 (2020).
169. People v. McKown, No. 4-19-0660, 2021 WL 3721433, at *4 (Ill. Ct. App.
Aug. 23, 2021) (internal quotations omitted). While this was only an appellatelevel decision, as of December 2021, McKown had not appealed his conviction.
The Illinois Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on how to interpret the child
pornography statute with respect to morphed images.
170. Id. at *12.
171. Id. at *13 (quoting Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242).
172. Id. at *11, *13.
173. Id. at *13 (internal quotations omitted).
174. In Texas, the Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest authority on issues
of criminal law. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5.
175. State v. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d 128, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
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In State v. Bolles, the court considered whether the possession of a cropped
image of a child’s genitals constituted child pornography under the state
statute, which requires the image depict “a child younger than 18 years
of age at the time the image of the child was made.”176 The original image
depicted a young girl—”of about three years old”—sitting on a bench
such that a portion of her genitals was visible.177 The defendant had used
the zoom function on his camera to crop the image to focus only on the
genitals.178 While the subject of the cropped image was clearly underage,
the court of appeals found in favor of the defendant, reasoning that
because that particular child was over eighteen when he “made” the
image by cropping it, the image did not constitute child pornography.179
The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this argument on review,
reasoning that the image was “made” within the meaning of the statute
“on the day the photograph was taken . . . when [the subject] was under
the age of 18.”180
To reach this conclusion, the court engaged in an overview of federal
and state court decisions on the issue of morphed images, finding that
child pornography “can be created by an individual who manipulates an
existing photograph of a minor into a different image even when the
original depiction is one of an innocent child acting innocently.”181 While
the specific conduct underlying the decision in Bolles is not a perfect
analogue to morphed child pornography, the court’s willingness to
account for digital manipulation compounded with its reference to
morphed image cases indicates that the Texas child pornography statute
likely covers morphed images.182
The divergent state court approaches to morphed images indicate
that legislative action would be the most effective way to implement a
state prohibition on morphed images. While state courts are split on the

176. Id. at 131. The Texas child pornography statute imposes liability on a
person who “knowingly or intentionally possesses . . . visual material that
visually depicts a child younger than 18 years of age at the time the image of the
child was made who is engaging in sexual conduct.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
43.26(a)(1) (West 2021). The statute also imposes a requirement that the depicted
conduct be lewd. Id. § 43.25(a)(2). After determining whether the image depicted
an underage child as a threshold matter, the court then determined that the image
satisfied the lewdness requirement. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d at 143–44. A Texas appellate
court has since interpreted the statute to apply only to material depicting actual
children, not purely virtual child pornography. Ex parte Fusselman, 621 S.W.3d
112, 122 (Tex. App. 2021).
177. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d at 130.
178. Id. at 131.
179. Id. at 133.
180. Id. at 135.
181. Id. at 138.
182. See id. at 136–37, 144.
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issue of whether the harms that morphed images pose justify criminal
liability, the Alaska statute provides a promising model for ensuring that
the criminal law protects children from the pornographic manipulation
of their images.

III. LOOKING OUTWARD: ALASKA’S STATUTE AS A MODEL FOR
OTHER STATES
The federal courts’ approaches to regulations on morphed images
indicate that Alaska’s ban on the possession of morphed images is
constitutional. For a regulation on morphed images to fall within the
boundaries of the federal and Alaska constitutions, the statute must
survive strict scrutiny review. A reviewing court’s threshold inquiry is
thus whether a ban on morphed images promotes a compelling
governmental interest.183 If so, the court then examines whether the
regulation is narrowly tailored to that end.184 This Part examines the
compelling state interest underlying the morphed images statute to argue
both that Alaska’s statute promotes the protection of children and that
other states should adopt an analogous statutory provision.
A. Alaska and Other States Have a Compelling Interest in Banning
Morphed Images
Morphed images harm children in a manner distinct from virtual
child pornography, implicating the perceptible interests of actual minors.
Unlike purely virtual child pornography, morphed images depict the
likeness of an actual minor, implicating similar interests in protecting
children to those raised by actual child pornography. Because the creation
of morphed images does not involve child sexual abuse, only Ferber’s first
rationale—that the materials permanently record an actual child in an
apparent pornographic manner and “the harm to the child is exacerbated
by their circulation”—justifies banning morphed images.185
While the Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of
banning morphed-image child pornography, some circuit and state
courts have asserted a variety of overlapping interests that justify the

183. See Club SinRock, LLC v. Mun. of Anchorage, 445 P.3d 1031, 1037–38
(Alaska 2019) (noting that sexual content merits strong protection under the
Alaska Constitution and burdening this speech requires a compelling interest);
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (requiring a
compelling governmental interest).
184. Club SinRock, 445 P.3d at 1038 (requiring narrow tailoring); Sable, 492 U.S.
at 126 (same); see supra Section II.A.
185. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 & n.10 (1982).
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criminalization of morphed images.186 The emergent theme from courts
confronting the issue is that, like with real child pornography, “the fear
of exposure . . . ha[s] the most profound emotional repercussions.”187
Research has found “[t]he lack of control over the ongoing sharing of . . .
abuse images and the public accessibility of those abuse images can be
one of the most difficult aspects of the abuse to overcome. . . . [T]he abuse
is ongoing with no definable end.”188 Unlike purely virtual child
pornography, which the Second Circuit found has only speculative
harmful effects on children, morphed images depict an identifiable child
in a sexual manner.189 As a result, morphed images cause more direct
harm to an actual child.
Litigants challenging statutory prohibitions on morphed images
have attempted to distinguish morphed images from traditional child
pornography by arguing that the goal of proscribing child pornography
is to prevent the underlying sexual abuse.190 However, the sections of the
Alaska code pertaining to digital harassment reflect the legislative
judgment that a digital image can be inherently harmful to its subject,
even if it does not depict historic sexual abuse.191
Specifically, Alaska’s innovative move to criminalize “revenge
porn” demonstrates that the dissemination of images not associated with
any underlying abuse nevertheless has the capacity to harass the images’
subjects.192 From a policy perspective, the legislative judgment that
individuals have a legally cognizable interest in preventing the
dissemination of images that were consensually captured opens the door
to the conclusion that children ought not to have their images

186. See supra Section II.F.2.
187. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10 (quoting Ulrich C. Schoettle, Child Exploitation:
A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 289, 292 (1980)).
188. Ateret Gewirtz-Meydan et al., The Complex Experience of Child Pornography
Survivors, 80 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 238, 239 (2018) (citations omitted).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2011).
190. United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 263–64, 266 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020) (declining to limit the definition of child pornography
to only those materials depicting the underlying abuse of a minor).
191. See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120 (2021) (stating that the non-consensual
dissemination of a consensually taken image can constitute criminal harassment).
192. An Act Relating to Harassment, ALASKA H. JUDICIARY COMM. MINUTES, 24th
Leg., (Jan. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Judiciary Committee Minutes] (statement of Kevin
Meyer, Rep., Alaska State Legislature, at 1:54:27 PM); see ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120
(2021). Generally speaking, “revenge porn” refers to the non-consensual
dissemination of a sexual image that was often—but not always—shared or taken
consensually. Jessica M. Goldstein, ‘Revenge Porn’ Was Already Commonplace. The
Pandemic Has Made Things Even Worse., WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/revenge-pornnonconsensual-porn/2020/10/28/603b88f4-dbf1-11ea-b205ff838e15a9a6_story.html.

38.2 GRAY (DO NOT DELETE)

258

12/30/2021 12:33 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38:2

manipulated into pornography.193 While there is a manifest difference
between “revenge porn” and child pornography, the criminalization of
both reflects the idea that a digital image does not need to depict historic
sexual abuse to create problems for its subjects.
Indeed, while only someone who “publishes or distributes” such
images is liable under the harassment statute, section 11.61.123 of the
Alaska Statutes imposes liability on a viewer.194 Under section 11.61.123,
“[a] person commits the crime of indecent viewing . . . of a picture if the
person knowingly . . . views, or views a picture of, the private exposure
of the genitals, anus, or female breast of another person.”195 Private
exposure occurs when people expose their bodies in such a manner that
a reasonable person would not believe would result in the defendant’s
viewing.196 Read together, the revenge porn and private exposure statutes
operate to protect an individual from the specific harm that the
dissemination and later viewing of the images engenders, rather than the
interest associated with the initial capturing of the images.
Given the federal courts’ determination that children have a
compelling interest in preventing the manipulation of their images,
combined with the Alaska legislative judgment that images can
inherently be harmful, Alaska has a compelling state interest in protecting
children against morphed images.
B. Alaska’s Morphed Images Statute Satisfies Ferber
While federal courts have split on whether morphed images
categorically constitute unprotected speech,197 a statutory ban on
morphed images likely, at the very least, satisfies strict scrutiny.198 Under
First Amendment jurisprudence, the state’s interest in protecting children
from a permanent record of what appears to be them engaging in sexually
explicit conduct is likely sufficient to justify the intrusion on speech.199
While morphed images present less of a risk of psychological harms

193. Judiciary Committee Minutes, supra note 192, at 7 (statement of Lesil
McGuire, Chair, H. Judiciary Comm. at 2:10:12 PM).
194. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.123.
195. Id. § 11.61.123(a).
196. Id. § 11.61.123(e)(2).
197. Compare United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding
morphed images categorically unprotected speech), with United States v.
Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 895–96 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying strict scrutiny to a
prohibition on morphed images). In the wake of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Mecham that morphed images are unprotected speech, the circuit
split is less pronounced. See supra note 190.
198. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
199. See Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895.
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materializing than traditional child pornography,200 scholars posit that
the gravity of harm associated with morphed images may justify the
lower probability of harm.201 Courts have additionally cited reputational
harms flowing from morphed images, neither of which rely on the
subject’s knowledge.202
Given Alaska’s compelling interest in protecting children from the
psychological and reputational harms flowing from morphed images, the
statute is narrowly tailored to address only pornographic images that
have the potential to harm real children.203 The language requiring that
the material depict an “actual child” cabins the proposed statute’s scope
to speech that creates a permanent record of a minor’s image, aligning the
statute with the underlying harm.204 Likewise, the child pornography
statute only applies to material proscribed by the “Unlawful Exploitation
of a Minor” statute, limiting impermissible morphed images to only those
depicting sexually explicit conduct.205
Relatedly, the Alaska ban on morphed images does not stretch
beyond analogous statutes that state and federal courts have found to
survive strict scrutiny.206 Like the federal morphed images provision, the
Alaska statute specifically requires that the image depict an actual minor
who is under the age of eighteen.207 When the Alaska legislature enacted
the statute, it referenced the Ashcroft decision, noting that child

200. The Ferber Court found it compelling that “[a] child who has posed for a
camera must go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within the
mass distribution system for child pornography.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 781 n.10 (1982) (quoting David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation
of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981)). A victim of a
morphed image may never know that the image exists, rendering the
psychological harm speculative. Cf. id. (“The victim’s knowledge of publication of
the visual material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the
child.”) (quoting T.C. Donnelly, Note, Protection of Children from Use in
Pornography: Toward Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 295, 301 (1979)).
201. Suzanne Ost, Criminalising Fabricated Images of Child Pornography: A Matter
of Harm or Morality?, 30 LEGAL STUD. 230, 241 (2010).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The jury
could find from looking at the picture that it is an image of an identifiable minor,
and that the interests of a real child were implicated by being posed in such a
way.”).
203. See supra Section III.A; Commonwealth v. Simone, 63 Va. Cir. 216, 245
(Oct. 2003) (noting the Virginia statute applies only to identifiable minors).
204. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127(a) (2021).
205. See id. (citing id. § 11.41.455).
206. See, e.g., Simone, 63 Va. Cir. at 255 (finding that limiting the virtual child
statute to identifiable minors comports with Ferber); United States v. Anderson,
759 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding that the federal prohibition on morphed
images survives strict scrutiny).
207. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(7), with ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127(a).
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pornography harms the child whose likeness is used.208
An Alaska court reviewing the statute could thus echo the Virginia
court’s determination in Simone that morphed images are “intrinsically
related” to child sex abuse, ergo justifying regulation.209 Because of the
statutory alignment between the cognizable harms morphed images pose
and the punishable conduct, a ban on morphed images would likely
survive strict scrutiny review.
C. Other States Should Explicitly Ban Morphed Images
The state and federal courts’ analysis of whether morphed images
involve a compelling state interest sufficient to justify the intrusion on
speech demonstrates that morphed images implicate the real interests of
real children.210 Not only do these analyses indicate the likely
constitutionality of such a prohibition, they also demonstrate how a state
ban on morphed images is desirable from a policy perspective. Indeed,
federal prosecutors continue to make use of the morphed images
provision of the PROTECT Act, demonstrating that the proliferation of
morphed images is more than a theoretical possibility.211 Accordingly,
state statutory bans on morphed images will provide state prosecutors
with the necessary tools to fight child exploitation crimes.
Given the need to address the possession of morphed images, an
explicit statutory ban is necessary for two additional reasons. First, the
state courts’ divergent approaches to statutory interpretation
demonstrates that an explicit statutory prohibition is the best way to

208. Finance Committee Minutes, supra note 115 (statement of Sue MacLean,
Director, Criminal Division, Department of Law at 8:23:13 AM).
209. See Simone, 63 Va. Cir. at 255 (finding that limiting virtual child
pornography statute to identifiable minors comports with Ferber).
210. See supra Section II.F.
211. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Vermont,
Huntington Man Sentenced for Child Pornography Offense (July 12, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-vt/pr/huntington-man-sentenced-childpornography-offense (describing the prosecution of a Vermont man for the
creation of a morphed image); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Middle
District of Pennsylvania, McConnellsburg Man Charged with Distribution of
Child Pornography (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usaomdpa/pr/mcconnellsburg-man-charged-distribution-child-pornography
(describing the indictment of a Pennsylvania man for allegedly producing,
possessing, and distributing a morphed image); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s
Office, Southern District of Texas, Septuagenarian Heads to Prison for Possessing
Over 30K Images of “Morphed” Child Pornography (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/septuagenarian-heads-prisonpossessing-over-30k-images-morphed-child-pornography
(describing
the
conviction of a Texas man for possessing morphed images).
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ensure with certainty that the conduct is criminalized.212 While some state
courts have been willing—especially recently—to read a ban on morphed
images into child pornography statutes,213 the unwillingness of other state
courts to do the same renders legislative action the clearest path to
prohibition.
Second, while a variety of Alaska and other states’ statutes purport
to protect individuals from the harms associated with the manipulation
of their digital images, other statutes are unable to capture the full breadth
of conduct necessary to prohibit morphed images.214 Alaska’s statutory
regime prior to the amendment of the child pornography statutes to cover
morphed images acutely demonstrates the need for a distinct prohibition.
For example, while the explicit conclusion that images taken
consensually can later be used to harass the images’ subjects motivated
the prohibition on “revenge porn,” the statute is underinclusive with
respect to morphed images.215 Specifically, with respect to mens rea, the
current harassment statute requires an “intent to harass;”216 however, it is
not just the deliberate use of morphed images to harass that renders them
so harmful.217 Courts have identified the reputational and psychological
effects associated with the existence of seemingly pornographic images
writ large as a significant cause of harm to children.218 For a child whose
likeness has been edited in a pornographic manner, the intent of the

212. See supra Section II.F.1.
213. See, e.g., People v. McKown, No. 4-19-0660, 2021 WL 3721433, at *13 (Ill.
Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2021) (finding Illinois’ child pornography statute applied to
morphed images); State v. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d 128, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)
(finding Texas’ child pornography state applied to images resulting from “image
editing and manipulation”).
214. For example, several states have statutes criminalizing revenge porn,
reflecting the interest in preventing the non-consensual dissemination of an image
that does not necessarily depict underlying abuse. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §
647(j)(4)(A) (West 2021) (prohibiting the intentional dissemination of an intimate
image of another where the depicted individual expected the image to remain
private); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-107(1)(a) (2021) (same); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 3-809 (West 2021) (same).
215. Judiciary Committee Minutes, supra note 192, at 7 (statement of Lesil
McGuire, Chair, H. Judiciary Comm. at 2:10:12 PM).
216. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120.
217. Gewirtz-Meydan et al., supra note 188, at 239 (noting victims of child
pornography face lasting harms due to “lack of control over the ongoing sharing
of their abuse images”).
218. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simone, 63 Va. Cir. 216, 243 (Oct. 2003)
(finding child pornography harmful because of the “permanent record” the
materials create); United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“[H]ere we have six identifiable minor females who were at risk of reputational
harm and suffered the psychological harm of knowing that their images were
exploited and prepared for distribution by a trusted adult.”).
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possessor is irrelevant.219 Indeed, a possessor of child pornography is
unlikely to be motivated by an intent to harass the child at all. While
individuals have complex and varied reasons for viewing child
pornography, research suggests that viewers are typically motivated by
the desire for sexual gratification rather than an intent to harm children.220
Moreover, with respect to actus reus, the harassment statute only
proscribes the “publi[cation] or distribut[ion]” of harassing images.221
Because the harms that images pose emanate from the mere possession of
the images,222 the actus reus provision is insufficient to curtail the entire
scope of problematic activity. Accordingly, a “revenge porn” statute is
insufficient to ban morphed images.
For states lacking a statutory prohibition on morphed images that
seek to amend their child pornography statutes to include such a
prohibition, Alaska’s statute is a promising model. First, Alaska’s statute
crisply and definitively criminalizes the type of conduct capable of
harming children.223 By defining the prohibited material as both that
which displays an actual minor or has been modified to do so, the statute
leaves little room for courts to quibble over its breadth.224 Functionally,
the application of Alaska’s statute to the possession of morphed images
is clear.
Second, as previously explained, Alaska’s statute is narrowly
tailored to the cognizable harms that morphed child pornography
engenders.225 For example, unlike the state private exposure statute,
which prohibits the viewing of the private exposure of any sort of

219. This reasoning comports with the judicial recognition in State v. Parker
that the creation of a permanent record is “one of the most harmful aspects of
child pornography.” 147 P.3d 690, 697 (Alaska 2006). Unlike traditional “revenge
porn,” which becomes problematic as a function of its use, child pornography—
whether morphed or real—depicting an actual child has no socially acceptable
use. Thus, it is unnecessary to prohibit only the intentional viewing of child
pornography because the child subject of the pornography is harmed regardless
of whether the viewer knew the subject’s age.
220. Mary L. Pulido, Exploring Why Offenders View Internet Child Pornography,
HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Feb. 29, 2019, 6:06 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/exploring-why-offenders-v_b_9330296.
221. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120. Additionally, a violation of Alaska’s harassment
statute is only a class B misdemeanor, whereas violating Alaska’s child
pornography statute is a class C felony. Compare id., with id. § 11.61.127. If the
private possession of child pornography implicates the same derivative harms as
possession of a morphed image, the punishments should align.
222. United States v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 895–96 (8th Cir. 2014).
223. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127.
224. Cf. People v. McKown, No. 4-19-0660, 2021 WL 3721433, at *13 (Ill. Ct.
App. Aug. 23, 2021) (finding that the Illinois statute covered morphed images by
interpreting a “similar visual medium” to include altered images).
225. See supra Section III.B.
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nudity,226 the child pornography statute defines prohibited conduct to
cover only depictions of children engaging in sexually explicit activity.227
Thus, possessing an image that depicts a nude child in a manner deemed
not to be “lewd” would be illegal under the private exposure statute, but
not the child pornography statute.228 While it is perhaps unlikely that a
hypothetical amendment to the private exposure statute to include
morphed images would sweep benign conduct into its ambit, the practical
effect of such an amendment would proscribe a broader range of conduct
as it relates to morphed images than to real child pornography.229
Because the Alaska child pornography statute is intrinsically linked
to the requirement that the underlying material depict sexually explicit
conduct, it is narrowly tailored to address the harms that morphed images
create. Defining prohibited material to only that displaying a child in a
sexual manner comports with the harms that courts have associated with
morphed images. For example, in Bach, the Eighth Circuit emphasized
how the “lascivious” nature of the image in question created a harmful
permanent record of an identifiable minor.230 Since the harms associated
with morphed images are derivative of the injuries that child
pornography inflicts,231 narrow tailoring of the proposed morphed
images statutes requires limiting their reach to that of the general child
pornography statute. If a state’s morphed images statute were to
criminalize material that would not be illegal under the child
pornography statute, courts would be reluctant to find it “narrowly
tailored” to protect children.
Because Alaska’s statute both functionally prohibits the range of
conduct that is capable of harming children while remaining narrowly
tailored to that end, other states seeking to update their child
pornography statutes should incorporate language from Alaska’s.

226. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.123. This section does not have a morphed images
provision. Id. “[A] person commits the crime of indecent viewing . . . of a picture
if the person knowingly . . . views, or views a picture of, the private exposure of
the genitals, anus, or female breast of another person.” Id. This statute thus
presupposes that the “private exposure” and “genitals, anus, or female breast”
components of the statute refer to the same person. Id.
227. Id. § 11.61.127.
228. Compare id. § 11.61.123, with id. § 11.61.127.
229. Although the Alaska Supreme Court has not offered a judicial
interpretation of the phrase “lewd,” it likely distinguishes sexual conduct from
non-sexual
conduct.
See
Lewd,
CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/lewd (last visited Oct.
22, 2021) (defining “lewd” as “sexual in an obvious and rude way”); cf. State v.
Parker, 147 P.3d 690, 697 (Alaska 2006) (referencing the lewdness requirement in
section 11.41.455 of the Alaska Statutes without offering a definition).
230. United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2005).
231. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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IV. LOOKING INWARD: IS A BAN ON VIRTUAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY WARRANTED?
Alaska’s statutory prohibition on morphed images demonstrates
how Alaska legislators have proactively addressed novel threats that
technology can pose.232 When enacting the statutory ban on morphed
images, the Alaska legislature contemporaneously considered a ban on
virtual child pornography.233 Proponents of the legislation noted that
while Alaska was on the “bleeding edge,” it should be on the “cutting
edge of laws holding people accountable.”234
Aaron Sperbeck, a then crime-against-children prosecutor in the
Anchorage District Attorney’s Office, supported the legislation,
emphasizing the purported connection between virtual child
pornography and real child abuse.235 A Detective Sergeant in the
Anchorage Police Department noted that the Internet Crimes Against
Children Task Force was “uncovering large collections of computergenerated child pornography,” indicating the scope of the problem.236
However, the legislature ultimately declined to enact the provision
232. This is not the first time Alaska has taken pioneering action to limit the
use of technology in sexual harassment and exploitation crimes. See People v.
Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 452 (Ill. 2019) (discussing Alaska’s “revenge porn”
statute). New Jersey was the first state to pass a “revenge porn” statute in 2004;
by 2013, only Alaska and Texas had enacted similar statutes. Id. By 2017, however,
thirty-nine states in total had some sort of “revenge porn” statute on their books.
Id. In Alaska, concerns about preventing harassment through the use of new
technology animated the inclusion of the provision. Judiciary Committee Minutes,
supra note 192 (statement of Kevin Meyer, Rep., Alaska State Legislature, at 1:54:27
PM).
233. An Act Relating to the Crimes Of Harassment, Possession of Child Pornography,
and Distribution of Indecent Material to a Minor; Relating to Suspending Imposition of
Sentence and Conditions of Probation or Parole for Certain Sex Offenses; Relating to
Aggravating Factors in Sentencing; Relating to Registration as a Sex Offender or Child
Kidnapper; Amending Rule 16, Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure; and Providing for
an Effective Date, HOUSE FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 26th Leg., (Mar. 19, 2010) (statement
of Anne Carpeneti, Assistant Att’y Gen, Criminal Division, Department of Law,
at 2:25:10 PM).
234. Id. (statement of Anna Fairclough, Rep., Alaska State Legislature, at
2:29:10 PM).
235. Megan Holland, Legislators Look to Expand Alaska’s Child Pornography Law,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.adn.com/alaskanews/article/legislators-look-expand-alaskas-child-pornographylaw/2009/10/12/.
236. An Act Relating to the Crimes of Harassment, Possession of Child Pornography,
and Distribution of Indecent Material to a Minor; Relating to Suspending Imposition of
Sentence and Conditions of Probation or Parole for Certain Sex Offenses; Relating to
Aggravating Factors in Sentencing; Relating to Registration as a Sex Offender or Child
Kidnapper; Amending Rule 16, Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure; and Providing for
an Effective Date, HOUSE. JUD. STANDING COMM., 26th Leg., (Feb. 1, 2010) (statement
of Ron Tidler, Detective Sergeant, Anchorage Police Department, at 1:34:09 PM).
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criminalizing virtual child pornography, citing both resource
constraints237 and constitutional problems.238
The question thus remains whether Alaska should go further to
incorporate a ban on virtual child pornography into its statute, or whether
morphed images serve as the outer limit of permissible regulation.
Answering this question necessarily involves an analysis of the thorny
constitutional landscape surrounding virtual child pornography. Because
the Supreme Court has held virtual child pornography to be protected
speech,239 any proposed state statute limiting that speech must survive
strict scrutiny. Federal courts have yet to see litigation over the
“indistinguishable” language in the PROTECT Act, and states with
similar statutory language have avoided the constitutional question.240
Accordingly, the precise contours of Alaska’s legislative authority over
virtual child pornography remain in flux.
To ascertain whether a state ban on virtual child pornography
exceeds constitutional limits, this Part explores the various interests that
could support a virtual child pornography prohibition. Because doctrinal
developments and constant technological advancement make the legality
of digitally rendered pornography uncertain, the lack of a compelling
state interest at this juncture does not foreclose the possibility of future
regulation. Accordingly, to ensure the state of the criminal law tracks the
development of criminal conduct, legislators ought to be aware of the
salient issues that virtual child pornography could implicate. This Part
identifies the potential relationship between virtual child pornography

237. An Act Relating to the Crimes of Harassment, Possession of Child Pornography,
and Distribution of Indecent Material to a Minor; Relating to Suspending Imposition of
Sentence and Conditions of Probation or Parole for Certain Sex Offenses; Relating to
Aggravating Factors in Sentencing; Relating to Registration as a Sex Offender or Child
Kidnapper; Amending Rule 16, Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure; and Providing for
an Effective Date, SEN. JUD. STANDING COMM., 26th Leg., (Apr. 5, 2010) (statement of
Hollis French, Sen., Alaska State Legislature, at 12:04:24 PM).
238. Id. (statement of Jerry Luckhaupt, Attorney, Legislative Affairs Agency,
at 12:04:24 PM).
239. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002).
240. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008) (addressing only
the pandering provision of the PROTECT Act). While Wyoming’s child
pornography statute proscribes materials “virtually indistinguishable” from real
child pornography, Wyoming state courts have avoided the overbreadth question
by holding the statute constitutional as applied to possession of real child
pornography. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-303 (West 2021); Jones v. State, 173 P.3d
379, 384 (Wyo. 2007). Likewise, Maryland’s child pornography statute includes an
“indistinguishable” phrase, but its state courts have yet to analyze its First
Amendment viability. MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 11-208 (2021); cf. e.g., Payne v.
State, 221 A.3d 997, 1014–15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2019) (discussing the
“indistinguishable” language of Maryland statute without reference to
constitutionality).
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and both child abuse and the effect on prosecutions of actual child
pornography. Although there is currently little evidence of a strong
relationship to either, this Part suggests how the Alaska legislature could
address these issues should they arise.
A. The Unresolved Connection to Abuse
For courts to find virtual child pornography sufficiently analogous
to real child pornography to justify its prohibition, it must be
“intrinsically related” to child abuse.241 Ferber focused on how the
production of real child pornography involved child abuse.242 Thus, on its
face, virtual child pornography is distinct from actual child pornography
because it neither contributes to the market for child abuse nor victimizes
an identifiable child.243
However, while the Supreme Court in Ashcroft found the
government’s theory of how virtual child pornography begets child abuse
unconvincing, it left open the possibility of whether a more direct link
between child pornography and downstream abuse could justify a ban on
virtual child pornography.244
The theoretical rationale underlying the argument that viewers of
child pornography are more likely to sexually abuse children has intuitive
appeal. The proliferation of internet communities dedicated to such
materials normalizes the “illicit sexual desires” of the viewer;
consequently, the argument goes, desensitized viewers may feel more
empowered to “break down the natural barriers to contact offenses.”245
While there have been numerous empirical studies published
following the Ashcroft decision that seemingly confirm a relationship
between viewing child pornography and sexually abusing children, the
empirical evidence may obscure the issue more than clarify it. Among the
most cited is the Butner Prison study, conducted in 2009 on male federal
prisoners in a voluntary sexual offender treatment program.246 The
241. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
242. See id. (“[T]he materials produced are a permanent record of the children’s
participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation.”).
243. Contra id. at 759 (discussing how ban on actual child pornography “dr[ies]
up the market” for material produced by child abuse); United States v. Bach, 400
F.3d 622, 632 (explaining that morphed images victimize an identifiable child
every time the image is displayed).
244. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253–54.
245. Online Child Pornography: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and
Transp., 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (testimony of Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.).
246. Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: A
Report on the Incidence of Hands-On Child Victimization by Child Pornography
Offenders, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183 (2009).
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subjects, all serving sentences for child pornography convictions, were
asked to self-report sexual contact with minors.247 Following the
treatment program, eighty-five percent of the study participants selfreported engaging in prior sexual contact with a minor.248 The study
authors interpreted this increase in self-reporting to “indicate that the
majority of so-called child pornographers in [the] sample are, in fact,
undetected child abusers,” seemingly demonstrating a link between
viewing child pornography and sexual contact with a child.249 While there
are limitations to this study, it suggests a correlation between viewing
child pornography and sexual contact with minors.
Similarly, the 2005 National Juvenile Online Victimization (J-NOV)
study found that, of those arrested for child pornography possession,
forty percent had also committed a crime of child sexual abuse.250 The
primary drawback of the study is its failure to provide a causal link that
demonstrates how child pornography drives sexual abuse of children.251
Indeed, a study conducted between 1995 and 2005 examined the
relationship between child pornography possession and pedophilia,
finding that between two groups of child pornography possessors—those
with a history of child sex abuse and those without—both showed equal
propensity for pedophilia.252 These results indicate that a third factor,
pedophilic tendencies, is likely driving both child sex abuse and child
pornography possession, rather than either of the two latter factors
influencing each other.
At this juncture, the empirical evidence represents continuing
scholarly disagreement on the relationship between child pornography
and child sex abuse. At minimum, the current literature likely does not
rise to the level of “a significantly stronger, more direct connection” that
247. Id. at 185. Prior to the program, only twenty-six percent of participants
reported sexual contact with minors. Id.
248. Id. at 187.
249. Id. at 188. There are, however, several limitations to this study. First, there
was no control group; the results were not measured against another group
charged with sex offenses. See id. at 190. Second, because the program relied on
voluntary participation, this group of offenders may not accurately represent
child pornography viewers. Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade and
Its Net-Widening Effect, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1696–1710 (2012).
250. JANIS WOLAK, DAVID FINKELHOR & KIMBERLY J. MITCHELL, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM
THE NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION STUDY 16 (2005).
251. Id. at 41 (explaining study methodology as conducting surveys using
random sampling).
252. Neil Malamuth & Mark Huppin, Drawing the Line on Virtual Child
Pornography: Bringing the Law in Line with the Research Evidence, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 773, 793 (2007) (citing Michael C. Seto, James M. Cantor & Ray
Blanchard, Child Pornography Offenses Are a Valid Diagnostic Indicator of Pedophilia,
115 ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 610 (2006)).
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the Ashcroft majority posited may justify regulation.253 Although further
technological advancement and empirical research may be more fruitful,
the abuse rationale seems insufficient to support a ban on virtual child
pornography.254
B. Virtual Pornography, Real Prosecutions
A second policy justification for prohibiting virtual child
pornography emanates from the prosecution rationale Justice Thomas
found compelling in Ashcroft.255 Ultimately concurring in the majority’s
judgment, Justice Thomas counseled against closing the door to some
form of burden-shifting that would require a defendant to raise his belief
that the materials did not depict real children as an affirmative defense.256
Animating Justice Thomas’ concurrence was a concern that technological
advancement that renders virtual child pornography indistinguishable
from pornography that depicts real children might frustrate efforts to
prosecute the latter.257 Justice Thomas nevertheless qualified his
concurrence with the observation that the government failed to
demonstrate that this defense had ever been successfully raised.258
The Senate Report accompanying the PROTECT Act reflects
Congress’s fear that virtual child pornography will threaten child
pornography prosecutions.259 Referencing a 2002 photographic array of
both virtual and real children that the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children presented, this report concludes that “an ordinary
person looking at these pictures would be hard-pressed to distinguish
between the real and virtual depictions.”260 According to the report, the
increasing proliferation of virtual child pornography threatens

253. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253–54 (2002).
254. Neil Malamuth and Mark Huppin argue that there is empirical research
to suggest child pornography may increase the risk of recidivism among male sex
offenders. Malamuth & Huppin, supra note 252, at 806. They posit that a narrow
statute that proscribes virtual child pornography for convicted sex offenders may
survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 820. While this is certainly an interesting option and
should be considered by legislatures in the future, the study relied on research of
pornography’s general effect, not just child pornography. Id. at 805. Accordingly,
this Note does not consider the possibility of proscribing virtual child
pornography for convicted sex offenders because, if the results of the study do
indeed hold true, the responsive statute should not be limited to virtual child
pornography. See id.
255. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 259 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 4–5 (2003).
260. Id. at 5.
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prosecutions across two dimensions.261 First, virtual child pornography
“arm[s] defendants with a powerful defense,”262 frustrating guilty pleas
even in “clear-cut child porn cases.”263 Second, the prospect of such a
defense has a chilling effect on prosecutors bringing charges for
possession of child pornography.264
These concerns may have merit. In United States v. Sims,265 a
defendant challenged his conviction for possession of child pornography
on the basis that, under Ashcroft, the government failed to meet its burden
of demonstrating the images he possessed depicted real children.266 The
district court granted his motion for acquittal with respect to one of the
images, reasoning that the government failed to demonstrate that the
image in question “involved the use of actual children engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.”267 Similarly, in United States v. Reilly,268 a
district court permitted the defendant to withdraw his earlier guilty plea
in the wake of the Ashcroft decision, holding that, to support a conviction
for child pornography, the defendant must have knowledge as to whether
the materials depicted real children.269
Conversely, because the issues of whether the images depicted real
children and whether the defendant had knowledge as to that
circumstance are factual questions left to the jury, the effect that a virtual
child pornography defense has on prosecutions may be more minimal
than feared.270 Courts have held that expert testimony is not required to
demonstrate that an image depicted a real child, reasoning that a trier of
fact is “capable of reviewing the evidence to determine whether the
Government met its burden to show that the images depicted real

261. See id. (“Absent legislation, this problem threatens to become entirely
unmanageable in the near future.”).
262. Id.
263. Id. (quoting 148 CONG. REC. S4393 (daily ed. May 15, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Leahy)).
264. Id.
265. 220 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (D.N.M. 2002).
266. Id. at 1224.
267. Id. at 1227. It is worth noting that the procedural posture of the
defendant’s appeal may have contributed to the outcome in this case. See id.
Because the Ashcroft decision was handed down in the interim between the
defendant’s conviction and appeal, the district court ruled that the government’s
failure to present evidence that the materials depicted real children at trial was
insufficient under Ashcroft. Id. The court’s finding could thus be interpreted to
stand for the proposition that the government must present some sort of evidence
at trial, instead of that it will be inherently difficult for the government to secure
convictions no matter what. Id.
268. No. 01 CR 1114 (RPP), 2002 WL 31307170, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2002).
269. Id. at *6.
270. See, e.g., United States v. Farrelly, 389 F.3d 649, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2004).
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children.”271
Indeed, juries have been willing to convict for possession of child
pornography, even when the virtual nature of the materials is in question.
In United States v. Kimbrough,272 the Fifth Circuit upheld a child
pornography conviction over the defendant’s argument that the
government failed to prove knowledge that the materials presented a real
minor.273 Relevant to the court’s decision was the sufficiency of the jury
instructions, reasoning the jury could have acquitted the defendant “had
[they] believed [his] defense.”274
Similarly, in United States v. Pabon-Cruz,275 a district court reasoned
that because knowledge is difficult to prove conclusively, “[p]roof
beyond a reasonable doubt may be made out by circumstantial
evidence.”276 There, the court concluded, the fact that investigators found
over 500 photographic and 200 video files of child pornography on the
defendant’s computer could support an inference that the defendant
could not have believed all of the media was virtual.277
In Alaska, this type of defense has played out similarly. As the court
made clear in Ferrick, to secure a conviction for a violation of the child
pornography statute, the state must prove that defendants both
committed the requisite act and had knowledge as to their conduct.278 For
example, in Ramos v. State,279 a jury convicted Ramos for knowingly
possessing child pornography under the Alaska statute despite his
argument that he did not know the pornographic images he downloaded
depicted minors.280 Thus, even though Ramos argued he did not have
knowledge as to the fact the pornography depicted minors, the jury was
willing to find him in violation of the statute. This result, alongside
Kimbrough, suggests that even when defendants dispute their knowledge
as to whether pornography depicts an actual person under the age of
eighteen, juries will not necessarily accept this defense on its face. Indeed,
because Alaska’s statutory definition of knowledge includes awareness of
a substantial probability of the prohibited circumstance, the abstract

271. Id. at 655; see also, e.g., United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th
Cir. 2003).
272. 69 F.3d 723 (1995). Notably, this case predates Ashcroft, suggesting that
defendants attempted to raise creative virtual child pornography defenses even
prior to the Ashcroft decision.
273. Id. at 733.
274. Id.
275. 255 F. Supp. 2d 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
276. Id. at 206.
277. Id.
278. Ferrick v. State, 217 P.3d 418, 421 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
279. No. A-12373, 2018 WL 3471826 (Alaska Ct. App. July 18, 2018).
280. Id. at *4.
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existence of virtual child pornography does not offer an absolute bar to
proving that a defendant had the requisite mens rea.281 Based on Ferrick
and Ramos, the more likely obstacle to prosecution would arise if
defendants believed they were viewing pornography that depicted an
actual child but were only in possession of virtual child pornography.282
Thus, in the wake of Ashcroft, it appears that more defendants are
raising the issue of virtual images at trial.283 However, while this might
increase prosecutors’ burdens to demonstrate the real nature of the
materials in their cases-in-chief, there are few cases to suggest that the
availability of this defense is anything more than a creative trial
strategy.284 Even in cases where the defendant raised the virtual child
pornography issue, juries have nevertheless concluded that the materials
depicted real children.285 The evidence thus far suggests that, both on the
federal level and in Alaska, prosecutors are not encountering significant
roadblocks to conviction.
C. Strict Scrutiny Demands More
At this juncture, the connection between virtual child pornography
and state interests in protecting prosecutions and preventing abuse is too
attenuated to constitute a compelling state interest. However, the current
evidentiary treatment of virtual child pornography suggests that trial
courts will encounter difficult questions as virtual materials proliferate.
A significant problem with the courts’ analytical approach to virtual
child pornography—whereby whether an image is virtual or not is a
question for the trier of fact—is that it fails to account for technological
innovation. In deferring to the jury to determine the nature of an image,
courts have reasoned “the images themselves [will] provide[] evidence of
the ages of the persons depicted.”286 But the nature of the problem
presupposes otherwise.287 Under Alaska’s current legislative scheme, the
jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that an image depicts a real
child; a digitally altered photo that is indistinguishable from real child
281. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(2) (2021).
282. See Ferrick, 217 P.3d at 421 (holding that proof that the pornographic
image depicted an actual minor was necessary to convict under the child
pornography statute).
283. See supra Section II.B.2.
284. See supra Section II.B.2.
285. See supra Section II.B.2.
286. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 874 N.E.2d 1089, 1103 (Mass. 2007) (quoting
People v. Girard, 709 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)).
287. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11) (“[T]he term ‘indistinguishable’ used with respect to
a depiction, means virtually indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such that
an ordinary person viewing the depiction would conclude that the depiction is of
an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”).
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pornography cannot support that conclusion.288 As a practical matter, the
increasing sophistication of virtual child pornography requires the
prosecutor to either provide an expert witness to testify to the forensics of
the image or rely on databases to identify the child depicted.289
Perhaps this outcome is desirable. Genuinely benign conduct should
not come within the scope of criminal punishment just because it makes
the prosecutor’s job easier,290 and there is little evidence to suggest that
the virtual child pornography defense has become an abusive trial
tactic.291 However, the combination of placing the burden of proof on the
government with the implication that the ordinary person cannot
distinguish virtual child pornography from that which is real creates a
risk of manipulation, because a defendant can contest his child
pornography prosecution without adducing any additional proof.292
If virtual child pornography ripens into a tangible hurdle for Alaska
prosecutors, the PROTECT Act is a viable model for statutory language
to address this problem.293 By sweeping only virtual child pornography
that is “indistinguishable” from that depicting an actual child into its
ambit, the PROTECT Act covers only conduct that prevents the ordinary
juror from accurately assessing whether the prosecution has proven the
factual predicate of the possession crime.294 Because of the narrowness of
the statutory language, the “indistinguishable” definitional provision
only excludes possession of an image that the ordinary juror could make
a determination on one way or another.
Although “[t]he Government may not suppress lawful speech as the
means to suppress unlawful speech,” a statute proscribing only materials
“indistinguishable” from real child pornography is an adequate
mechanism to filter out protected speech.295 Concurring in part and
dissenting in part with the Ashcroft judgment, Justice O’Connor posited
that changing the language of the child pornography definition from
“appears to be” to “virtually indistinguishable from” would provide
sufficient narrow tailoring to cure the statute from an overbreadth

288. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127 (2021); Ferrick v. State, 217 P.3d 418, 421
(Alaska Ct. App. 2009) (holding that possession of images depicting a real child is
a necessary factual predicate to the offense).
289. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 4 (2003).
290. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975).
291. See supra Section II.B.2.
292. Of course, this argument ignores the reality that juries seem unwilling to
buy into the virtual child pornography defense. United States v. Farrelly, 389 F.3d
649, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2004).
293. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
294. Id. § 2256(8)(B).
295. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
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challenge.296
Specifically, the difference between “appears to be” and
“indistinguishable” is nontrivial. As Justice O’Connor noted, material
that “appears to be” a child engaging in sexual activity sweeps too
broadly; it would cover sexually suggestive “cartoon sketches or statues
of children.”297 Material that is indistinguishable from actual child
pornography is more limited. To ensure a defendant cannot fabricate lack
of knowledge as a perfunctory defense, a statute that bans only material
that appears to the reasonable viewer to be child pornography addresses
the core concern that a jury may not believe, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant knew the nature of the materials.
Ultimately, because of the dearth of evidence that the availability of
virtual child pornography as a defense has manifestly frustrated child
pornography prosecutions, Alaska cannot presently proscribe images
that do not depict a real child without contravening First Amendment
principles. However, Alaska legislators should maintain awareness of
evolving technology and how it affects prosecutorial burdens. If the use
of an expert witness to testify to an image’s origins becomes a de facto
requirement in criminal prosecutions, an amendment to the state code
may be necessary to alleviate the burden on the state criminal division. If
virtual child pornography proves to threaten state prosecutions of real
child pornography, legislation that parallels the PROTECT Act’s
“indistinguishable” language may be viable under strict scrutiny review.

V. CONCLUSION
States with child pornography statutes that fail to proscribe the
possession of morphed images suffer from a fundamental mismatch
between the interests that states assert to justify the private possession of
child pornography and the scope of the conduct covered. Fortunately, as
federal prosecutors capitalize on the morphed images provision of the
PROTECT Act and state legislatures adopt parallel statutes, there appears
to be movement toward more universal state standards on morphed
images. As one of the first states to enact a statutory ban on morphed
images, Alaska offers a valuable model for states to base amendment to
their child pornography statutes on. Not only is Alaska’s statute broad
enough to cover conduct harmful to children, but it is also concurrently
narrow enough to comport with the First Amendment.
However, morphed images are likely the outer limit of what Alaska
can currently constitutionally proscribe. Given the lack of substantial
296. Id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
297. Id. at 264.
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evidence demonstrating a connection between purely virtual child
pornography and tangible harm to children, the First Amendment
constrains Alaska’s regulatory ability. Nevertheless, the issue is still live:
as technology continues to advance, the evidentiary burdens that courts
have crafted around virtual child pornography threaten to impede
prosecutions for real child pornography. The ability of defendants to raise
virtual child pornography as a token defense creates a potential opening
for future legislation, and Alaska should not close the door quite yet.

